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We assemble a dataset on technology adoption in 1000 B.C., 0 A.D., and 1500 A.D. for the predecessors
to today's nation states. We find that this very old history of technology adoption is surprisingly significant
for today's national development outcomes. Although our strongest results are for 1500 A.D., we find
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The study of economic development usually emphasizes modern determinants of per capita 
income like quality of institutions to support free markets, economic policies chosen by 
governments, human capital components such as education and health, or political factors 
like violence and instability. Could this discussion be missing an important, much more long 
run dimension to economic development? To the extent that history is discussed at all in 
economic development, it is usually either the divergence associated with the industrial 
revolution or the effects of the colonial regimes.
1 Is it possible that precolonial, preindustrial 
history also matters significantly for today’s national economic outcomes? 
 
This paper assembles a new dataset on the history of technology over 2500 years of history 
prior to the era of colonization and extensive European contacts. It finds that there were 
important technological differences between the predecessors to today’s modern nations as 
long ago as 1000 BC, and that these differences persisted to 0 AD and to 1500 AD (which 
will be the three data points in our dataset). These precolonial, preindustrial differences have 
striking predictive power for the pattern of per capita incomes across nations that we 
observe today. Although our strongest results are for the detailed technology dataset we 
assemble for 1500 AD, we also find surprisingly significant effects under plausible 
conditions for cruder measures of technological sophistication going back to 1000 BC. 
Moreover, technological history affects not only per capita income but also population size 
and thus total GDP (not surprisingly, since greater technological productivity could either 
support a larger population, or a higher income for the same size population, or – as we find 
– both). 
 
We do not claim to definitively resolve WHY technology in 1000 BC or 1500 AD still 
matters so much today, a question on which we hope to gain insight from further research. 
We think that the simplest explanation is that technological experience has an important 




These results also may be consistent with several well known models of very long run 
development. To give some selected examples, Kremer 1993 has a dynamic story for 
population (since 1 million BC!)  in which better technology makes possible a larger 
population (a la Malthus), and a larger population yields more inventors to make further 
technological advances. Galor and Weil 2000 (see also Galor 2005) have a related story of 
                                                 
1 A notable, honorable, and famous exception is Jared Diamond (1997) Guns, Germs, and Steel, however, this 
work did not systematically test the effect of ancient technologies on modern incomes as we will do here.  
Perhaps for that reason, the Diamond work did not change much the tendency of development economics to 
focus on the modern period or at most the colonial period. 
2 This is much debated in the economic history literature. Mokyr (1990, p. 169) stresses the importance of 
technology for growth but argues that technological experience has limited importance for new technology 
adoption: "It is misleading to think that nothing leads to technological progress like technological 
progress.” Rosenberg and Birdzell (1987) also minimize the role of previous technological experience for 
explaining “how the West grew rich.” Greene (2000) argues that, in the West, Greco-Roman dynamism 
was part of a long continuum from the European Iron Age to medieval technological progress and the 
industrial revolution.   3
very long run development with the critical added feature that advances in technology raise 
the rate of return to human capital, which causes the dynamic process to eventually switch 
over from extensive growth (output and population growth at the same rate) to intensive 
growth (per capita income growth). Jones (2005) emphasizes even more the non-rival nature 
of technological ideas, which inevitably generates increasing returns to scale (also featuring 
the feedback loop between population and ideas). If societies evolve in isolation through 
many eons, those who started out ahead would be even further ahead in both population 
and income today.  
 
We do not test the technology-population dynamics explicitly (lack of data on ancient 
population corresponding to today’s nations makes this impossible) Moreover, we don’t 
have enough data on non-technology variables to test these stories against rival hypotheses, 
To consider a very popular current hypothesis for the determinants of economic 
development, for example, it could also be that technological history may be proxying for 
institutional history. Unfortunately, we lack the detail on ancient institutions that we have on 
ancient technologies, so we cannot resolve this definitively. The aims of this paper are more 
modest than sorting out these rival models, leading to a simple conclusion: for long run 





2. Description of technology data set 
 
The datasets presented in this paper measure the cross-country level of technology adoption 
for over 100 countries in three historical periods: 1000 B.C., 0 A.D. and the pre-colonial 
period around 1500 A.D.  Each dataset acts as a “snap shot” in time, capturing the levels of 
technology adoption by country throughout the world.  In each time period, we determine a 
country’s level of technology adoption in five distinct sectors: communications, agriculture, 
military, industry, and transportation.  By aggregating these values, we determine a country’s 
overall level of technology adoption.   
 
Technology adoption is measured on the extensive margin by documenting whether a 
country uses a particular technology at all, not how intensively it is used.  For example, in the 
dataset for 1000 B.C., we consider two transportation technologies: pack animals and 
vehicles.  A country’s level of technology adoption in transportation is then determined by 
whether vehicles and/or draft animals were used in the country at the time. The technologies 
                                                 
3 Spolaore and Wacziarg (2006) have a fascinating exploration of the effect of genetic distance on log-
income distance. They take genetic distance as a difference between all characteristics vertically 
transmitted from parents to children (not only genetic, but even more importantly cultural), and suggest that 
differences in these characteristics act as a barrier to technology/development diffusion . They find that 
countries populated by more genetically distant cultures also have more different per capita incomes. This 
finding is complementary to ours because genetic distance is very persistent and was determined in a 
distant past. It differs, however, in at least two respects. First, we explore the effects of technology adoption 
history on current development. Our left hand side variable has a direct effect on development, while 
genetic distance surely does not have a direct effect on development. It is a proxy for costs of transferring 
technology. Second, by exploring a relationship in levels we are able to preserve the transitivity of our 
measures. This is not the case when looking at distances.   4
that we examine change between the ancient period (1000 B.C. and 0 A.D.) to the early 
modern period (1500 A.D.) to reflect the evolution of the technology frontier.   
  
Our focus on the extensive margin of technology adoption is motivated by data availability 
constraints.  It is much easier to document whether a technology is being used in a country 
(the extensive margin) rather then measuring the degree of its adoption (the intensive 
margin).  It is well documented that the Chinese were using iron for tools by 0 A.D; what is 
more difficult to assess is the share of tools constructed from iron at the time.   
 
Since our main objective is to analyze the effects that historic technology adoption has on 
the current state of economic development, our datasets are partitioned using present day 
countries.  We use the maps from the CIA’s The World Factbook (2006) to put into 
concordance the borders of present day countries with the cultures and civilizations in 1000 
B.C., 0 A.D. and 1500 A.D. For example, the technologies used by the Aztecs and their 
predecessors during pre-colonial times are coded as the ones used by Mexico in 1500 A.D.  
In cases where a country had multiple cultures within its borders during a certain time 
period, we take the culture with the highest level of technology adoption to represent that 
country.  This technique is justified since we are measuring the extensive margin of 
technology adoption in a country.  For example, in 1000 B.C. there were multiple cultures 
residing within Canada’s modern day borders.  The Initial Shield Woodland was the most 
technologically sophisticated of these cultures and we therefore use its level of technology 
adoption to represent Canada in 1000 B.C.       
 
Our datasets are primarily influenced by the work that ethnologists such as George Murdock 
and others have done on cross-cultural analysis (Murdock 1967; Carneiro 1970; Tuden and 
Marshall 1972; Barry and Paxson 1971).  Murdock and others were interested in compiling 
data on multiple cultures and comparing their traits using analytical methods.
4 A work that 
exemplifies this is “The Measurement of Cultural Complexity” (Murdock and Provost 1973).  
In that paper, 186 cultures are ranked by their level of cultural complexity.   Cultural 
complexity was measured using ten variables; these variables included the type of 
transportation a culture uses, the level of political integration and urbanization of a culture, 
and the degree of technological specialization.  Using these rankings, one can conclude that 
the Roman Empire was culturally more complex than the Masai of East Africa (Murdock & 
Provost 1973: 304).   
 
Since our interests lie in technology adoption within a specific time period, the ethnographic 
data described above hold little value for our analysis.  Therefore, we adapt the methodology 
used in the cross-cultural analysis work to develop our own technology adoption datasets.  
Murdock & Morrow (1970) in their work “Subsistence Economy and Supportive Practices”, 
provide a detailed description of the methodology that is commonly used to code a cross-
cultural dataset (Carneiro 1970; Tuden and Marshall 1972; Barry and Paxson 1971; Murdock 
and Wilson 1972).  In their work, Murdock and Morrow use over 400 sources to evaluate 
180 cultures.  A team of researchers survey multiple sources for each culture, take detailed 
notes in the form of direct quotations, record page numbers of references, and then code 
and rank each culture.  Inference is used by all of the authors to assist in their coding.  In 
                                                 
4 See the Human Relations Area Files at Yale University for an extensive collection of source material for over 
150 cultures.     5
Carneiro’s appendix to his dataset, he notes (1973: 854), “the presence of the trait, while not 
directly observable, may nevertheless be inferred from the presence of certain other traits 
which are themselves directly observable.”  All of our technology adoption datasets are 
coded following this described methodology.   
 
The datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. are derived from the “Atlas of Cultural Evolution” 
(Peregrine 2003), while we coded the dataset for 1500 A.D. in its entirety.  We include a 
detailed discussion about each dataset in the following sections.    
 
2.1 Technology Datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. 
 
The datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. measure the level of technology adoption for 
agriculture, transportation, communications, writing, and military on 113 and 135 countries 
respectively.  In each sector, we examine the same technologies for the two periods.  The 
datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. are based on Peter Peregrine’s (2003) “Atlas of Cultural 
Evolution”
5 (henceforward abbreviated as “ACE”).  In this work, Peregrine evaluates the 
traits (i.e. writing and records, agriculture, transportation, urbanization) of 289 prehistoric 
cultures that existed before 1000 A.D. following closely the same methodology as Murdock 
& Provost (1973).    
       
The source for the coding of the “ACE” dataset is the Encyclopedia of Prehistory (Peregrine & 
Ember 2001a), which is a nine volume work that documents over 250 prehistoric cultures. 
The Encyclopedia of Prehistory was compiled from contributions of over 200 authors and covers 
every geographic region of the world (Peregrine & Ember 2001b:3).  The Encyclopedia of 
Prehistory contains a profile of each prehistoric culture and summarizes the culture’s 
environment, settlements, economy, and social political organization.  Using the information 
from each profile, Peregrine codes the traits of each culture to construct the “ACE” dataset.   
 
It is important to note that the “ACE” limits its survey to prehistoric cultures; prehistory 
refers to the time period that precedes written records (Rouse 1972: 3).  Once a culture 
introduces written records, it is considered part of the historic period and excluded from the 
“ACE.”  Since written records were introduced at different times throughout the world, 
cultures have varying dates on when they entered the historic period.  For example, China, 
Greece, and Mesopotamia had written records during the first millennium B.C. (Rouse 1972: 
8) and are coded as historic regions in the “ACE” (Peregrine 2003).  Since most of the world 
in both 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. is prehistoric, the “ACE” provides data that covers most of 
the world.  We then make inferences on the historic regions of the world at 1000 B.C. and 0 
A.D. to complete our datasets.     
 
The “ACE” provides us with data documenting the cultural traits of prehistoric societies; 
our task was to convert this data in order to measure each country’s level of technology 
adoption.  The “ACE” dataset contains four variables of particular interest: “Writing and 
                                                 
5 Peregrine (2003) uses BP (Before Present) as the time variable when coding his datasets.  We convert the BP 
time periods to either B.C. or A.D.   Peregrine’s 3000 BP dataset is used for our 1000 B.C. dataset and 
Peregrine’s 2000 BP dataset is used for our 0 A.D. dataset.   
7 And in even more detail in a second appendix available from the authors that documents the information 
used to code each technology for each country.   6
Records,”  “Agriculture”, “Technological Specialization”, and “Land Transportation.”  We 
use these four variables to code the adoption of the technologies in communications, 
agriculture, industry, and transportation. Table 1 documents the concordance between the 
“ACE” and our technology adoption datasets.   
 
Each of the variables in the “ACE” dataset takes on one of three values as shown in the first 
column of Table 1.  For example, the variable “technology specialization,” can take on one 
of three values: a “3” indicates that metalwork is done by a culture; a “2” indicates that 
pottery is produced by a culture, and a “1” signifies an absence of both metalworking and 
pottery.  We take these values and convert them to signify the presence or absence of a 
technology.  In our technology adoption dataset, the presence of a technology was awarded a 
“1” while the absence was awarded a “0”.   
“ACE” Dataset  Technology Dataset for 1000 B.C. & 0 A.D.
( 0 = indicates absence of technology,       
1 = presence of technology)
Writing & Records Communication
1 = None
2 = Mnemonic or nonwritten records 0,1
3 = True Writing 0,1
Technological Specialization Industry
1 = None
2 = Pottery 0,1
3 = Metalwork (alloys, forging, casting) 0,1
Land Transport Transportation
1 = Human Only
2 = Pack or draft animals 0,1
3 = Vehicles 0,1
Agriculture Agriculture
1 = None 0
2 = 10% or more, but secondary 1
3 = Primary 2




Technology adoption in the agriculture sector is measured indirectly, as the “ACE” dataset 
did not code the actual technologies being used.  We infer that the greater the role that 
agriculture plays in a culture’s subsistence the more likely that advanced agricultural 
technologies were employed.  The appendix contains a more detailed discussion on how the 
agriculture sector is coded.   
 
An example of how we code a country in 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D will best illustrate our 
methodology.   
   7
Korea was inhabited by the Mumun peoples in 1000 B.C.  The Mumuns had no tradition of 
either writing or non-written records.  The Mumuns however did rely on agriculture as its 
primary form of subsistence and used pack animals for transportation.  In addition the 
Mumuns produced metalwork and used bronze for tools (Rhee 2001).  The coding for the 
Mumun entry in the “ACE” dataset (Peregrine 2003) therefore is:  
 
Writing and Records = 1 
Technology Specialization = 3 
Land Transportation = 2 
Agriculture = 3 
 
Based on this data, we code Korea in 1000 B.C. as:  
 
Communication: Mnemonic or nonwritten records = 0; True Writing = 0 
Industry: Pottery = 1; Metalwork = 1 
Transportation: Pack or draft animals = 1; Vehicles = 0 
Agriculture: 10% or more, but secondary = 1; Primary = 1 
 
We aggregate the technology adoption measures at the sector level by adding all the 
individual technology measures in the sector and dividing the sum by the maximum possible 
adoption level in the sector. In this way, the sectoral adoption level belongs to the interval 
[0,1]. The overall adoption level in each country and time period is the average of the 
adoption level across sectors. Obviously, the overall adoption level also belongs to the 
interval [0,1].  
 
The adoption levels in the four sectors just reported in Korea in 1000 B.C. are the following: 
 
Communications = 0 
Industry = 1 
Transportation = 0.5 
Agriculture = 1 
 
Coding for the historic regions of the world in 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. relied on a combination 
of inference and additional documentation.  Cultures with written records were the most 
technologically sophisticated at the time. A survey of the historic regions during these 
periods confirms this assumption.  In 1000 B.C., the historic regions include China, Egypt, 
Greece, and Mesopotamia, while in 0 A.D. the historic regions expand to encompass 
Western Europe and Persia.  All of these regions had advanced civilizations that were highly 
innovative relative to the rest of the world. For example, by 1000 B.C., Egypt, China, 
Greece, and Mesopotamia had growing city populations which relied on high productivity 
agriculture (Scarre 1988:122,144;  O’Brien 1999:30,36).  Wheeled chariots were invented in 
Mesopotamia around 3000 B.C., and were used in Egypt, Greece, and China by 1000 B.C.( 
Encyclopedia Britannica 2006h).  Jewelry and decorative ornaments constructed out of gold 
and silver are also evident in these cultures (Scarre 1988; O’Brien 1999).  We therefore code 
the historic regions in our dataset as having the highest level of technology adoption in 
agriculture, communications, transportation, and industry.      
   8
The “ACE” did not contain any variables that correspond to technologies used for military 
purposes.  To assess a country’s level of technology adoption for the military we use the 
“ACE” dataset to determine which metals were available for each culture.  Metallurgy is 
integral for the development of more advanced weapons (Macksey 1993:216; Scarre 1988; 
Collis 1997:29).  The progression from stone to bronze and finally iron corresponded to a 
progression of more powerful weapons; stone weapons were replaced by bronze swords and 
daggers; iron weapons were considerably stronger than their bronze predecessors (Hogg 
1968:19-22).  The “ACE” dataset defined many cultures by the type of metals they were 
using for tools.  Neolithic cultures are coded as having stone weapons, while Bronze and 
Iron Age cultures were coded as having bronze and iron weapons respectively. Prehistoric 
cultures not adequately described in the “ACE” dataset are coded through inference.  Since 
the people of the New World did not use bronze until near the time of European contact, all 
countries in North and South America are coded as not having bronze or iron weapons in 
1000 B.C. and 0 A.D (Diamond 1997:259; Kipfer 2000).     
 
The historic regions of 1000 B.C. (Mesopotamia, Northern Africa, Greece, China) did not all 
use iron for weapons.  We therefore differentiate iron producing regions from those that did 
not use the metal.  Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are coded as using iron since the Hittites 
became major producers of iron in the 3
rd millennium B.C. (Collis 1997:32; Kipfer 
2000:257).  Greece also had iron objects by 1200 B.C and is coded accordingly.  The two 
most prominent historic regions not possessing iron technology by 1000 B.C. are Egypt and 
China.  Both regions first used iron in the 6
th century B.C. (Wager 1993; Lucas 1934:198).  
Egypt and China however both used bronze well before 1000 B.C. (Kerr & Wood 2004:7; 
Erman 1971: 461) and our dataset in 1000 B.C. reflects this.   
 
The coding of historic regions in 0 A.D. proved much easier as iron technology had diffused 
throughout Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and China during the 1
st millennium 
B.C. (Kipfer 2000:258).  We therefore code all historic regions as using iron weapons in the 
0 A.D. dataset.       
 
2.2 Technology Dataset for 1500 A.D. 
 
The technology dataset for 1500 A.D. encompasses 113 countries and evaluates the level of 
technology adoption across the same five sectors (agriculture, transportation, military, 
industry, and communications) as the previous datasets.  The technology adoption dataset 
for 1500 A.D. differs from the prehistoric datasets in that it is not based on an existing work.  
While the datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. relied on the “ACE” (Peregrine 2003) for a 
preponderance of data, the dataset for 1500 A.D. is coded using over 170 source materials.   
 
Our technology measures outside Europe are estimated before European colonization. It is 
important to stress, therefore, that our technology measures in 1500 A.D. do not incorporate 
the technology transferred by Europeans to the rest of the world after European exploration 
began around 1500.  
 
Obviously, there is a larger number of sources covering the technology adoption patterns in 
1500 A.D. than in 1000 B.C. or 0 A.D. This allows us to collect adoption data for 20 
technologies in the four sectors other than agriculture vs. the eight technologies covered in 
the data sets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. As a result, our estimate of the level of technology   9
adoption in 1500 A.D. is likely to be more precise than for the earlier periods. Table 2 
presents the various technologies measured in 1500 A.D.  
 
Our technology datasets for 1500 A.D. involve surveying multiple sources (atlases, history 
books, journal articles) and determining whether a technology was used in a country.  
However, as with our datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D, the dataset for 1500 A.D. does 
include a proxy for the level of agricultural technology adoption.   
 
We must of course stress that there are many possible weak links in the chain to go from the 
source material on old cultures to our dataset corresponding to today’s nation states – such 
as the possibly tenuous link between ancient cultures and the territories of modern day 
nation states, and the possible errors of commission and omission on whether technologies 
are present given incomplete records, just to mention two. There also is likely to be selection 
bias in that more technologically advanced cultures are likely to leave better records.  
 
Despite these caveats, there are also important reasons to believe in the quality of our data. 
First, as we describe below, it builds on the methodological contributions of the existing 
literature. Second, it is based on a very extensive documentation described in detail in a 
separate appendix.
7 Third, it is much easier to code extensive than intensive measures of 
technology adoption for pre-colonial periods. The former is feasible, after a significant effort 
such as ours. The latter is just impossible. Third, as we shall see below, our technology 
adoption measures for 1500 A.D. are highly correlated to the technology adoption measures 
for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. from ACE. We find this supportive of the quality of our data given 
that they were constructed in a completely independent way. Finally, as we shall show below, 
the overall technology adoption measure is highly correlated to contemporaneous measures 
of the development of societies such as the urbanization rate. These arguments lead us to 
persist nevertheless in making the best of the always shaky nature of very old data in order to 









Standing Army An organization of professional soldiers. 0,1
Cavalry The use of soldiers mounted on horseback.   0,1
Firearms Gunpowder based weapons 0,1
Muskets The successor to the harquebus (the common firearm of European armies) 
was larger and a muzzle-loading firearm.  
0,1
Field Artillery
Large guns that required a team of soldiers to operate.  It had a larger caliber 
and greater range than small arms weapons. 0,1
Warfare capable ships Ships that were used in battle are considered "warfare" capable. 0,1
Heavy Naval Guns
Ships required significant advances in hull technology before they were 
capable of carrying heavy guns. 0,1
Ships (+180 guns), +1500 ton 
deadweight Large warships that only state navies had the capability of building.    0,1
Agriculture 
Hunting & Gathering The primary form of subsistence. 0
Pastoralism The primary form of subsistence. 1
Hand Cultivation The primary form of subsistence. 2
Plough Cultivation The primary form of subsistence. 3
Transportation
Ships Capable of Crossing the 
Atlantic Ocean Any ship that had successfully crossed the Atlantic Ocean. 0,1
Ships Capable of Crossing the 
Pacific Ocean
Any ship that had successfully crossed the Pacific Ocean. 0,1
Ships Capable of Reaching the 
Indian Ocean




The use of the wheel for transportation purposes.  The most common use 
was for carts. 0,1
Magnetic Compass The use of the compass for navigation. 0,1
Horse powered vehicles The use of horses for transportation. 0,1
Communications
Movable Block Printing The use of movable block printing. 0,1
Woodblock or block printing The use of woodblock printing. 0,1
Books The use of books. 0,1
Paper The use of paper. 0,1
Industry
Steel The presence of steel in a civilization. 0,1
Iron The presence of iron in a civilization. 0,1
Table 2: Variables in the 1500 A.D. dataset
 
 
The methodology for coding 1500 A.D. datasets follow the works mentioned previously by 
Murdock and Morrow (1970), Murdock and Provost (1973), Peregrine (2003), and Carneiro 
(1970).  We rely on two principal inference techniques while coding the dataset: 1) 
technological continuity (Basalla 1988) and 2) temporal extrapolation (Murdock & Morrow 
1970: 314).  Technological continuity is the idea that innovations are a result of previous   11
antecedents; innovations typically do not spontaneously arise without preexisting 
technologies.
8  Technological continuity allows us to infer that countries with advanced 
technologies also have more primitive ones.  The use of military technology in 1500 A.D. 
illustrates this technique.  Large warships with over 180 guns on deck were considered the 
pinnacle of military technology in 1500 A.D. (Black 1996).  We find that many countries 
with large warships also had advanced land weapons such as muskets and field artillery.  It is 
not unreasonable to assume a country must first acquire land-based arms technology before 
producing ships with large naval guns.  Therefore, in cases such as Portugal and Germany, 
where large warships were present we infer that these countries also had advance land 
weaponry. 
 
Temporal extrapolation is an inference technique we frequently use in the 1500 A.D. dataset.  
This technique assumes that once a technology is introduced into a country it is not 
forgotten. When a technology’s presence cannot be documented in a country in 1500 A.D., 
we look at preceding and following time periods.  If a technology is used by a country before 
1500 A.D. we infer that it was used during 1500 A.D. as well.  An example of this is our 
coding of transportation technology in China.   We were unable to document the presence 
of the magnetic compass in China during 1500 A.D., but could do so in the 2nd century 
A.D. (Adshead 1988:156).  By temporal extrapolation, we infer that the magnetic compass 
was still used in China in 1500 A.D.  We also use temporal extrapolation to infer the absence 
of a technology in a country if something at a point in time is documented as a “first.”  Since 
the first printing press in the Arabic world was established in Lebanon in 1706  (Stearns 
2001: 357), we infer that all Arabic countries did not have printing press technology in 1500 
A.D.   
 
Country concordance for the 1500 A.D. dataset follows the methodology we described in 
the introduction.  We assume that a technology used by a civilization diffuses throughout the 
regions it controlled.  An example is the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans controlled a wide 
swath of territory during 1500 A.D., including but not limited to modern day Egypt, Libya, 
Greece, and Iraq.  Technologies used by the Ottoman Empire were assumed to have 
diffused from Turkey to all the countries we cited as being under Ottoman control.     
 
The following passages briefly describe the process of determining levels of technology 
adoption for the military, agriculture, communications, transportation, and industrial sectors.  
Further discussion on our coding methodology is in the appendix. 
 
Military technology in 1500 A.D. 
 
We measure a country’s level of military technology adoption by documenting the presence 
of land and sea based weapons in a country.  In total, we document the presence of eight 
variables for each country.   
 
The variables that represent technology for land weaponry include: the presence of a 
standing army, the use of firearms, muskets, cavalry, and field artillery.  Sea based weapons 
are measured by the presence of naval warships and their armaments.  The types of sea 
                                                 
8 See Basalla (1988:30-57) for a number of case studies documenting technological continuity or technological 
evolution.     12
based weapons we document are: warfare capable ships, ships with heavy naval guns, and 
heavy warships that have over 180 guns and weigh over 1500 tons.   
 
Agricultural Technology in 1500 A.D. 
 
As with the datasets for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D., we use a country’s primary form of 
subsistence (hunting and gathering, pastoralism, agriculture) as a proxy for technology 
adoption in 1500 A.D.  This measure is rationalized by the fact that the adoption of some 
important agricultural technologies is necessary for a country to move from a hunter and 
gathering society to an agrarian one. In addition to this indirect measure, for those countries 
whose primary form of subsistence was agriculture, we also measure the adoption of plough 
cultivation.  
 
Transportation Technology in 1500 A.D. 
 
A country’s level of transportation technology adoption is measured by the forms of naval 
and land based transportation.  We examine six variables, four of which measure a country’s 
naval technology, while the remaining two measure land-based technology.  Land-based 
technologies include the wheel and animals used for transportation.  Naval-based 
transportation technology adoption is measured by whether a country’s seamen used 
magnetic compasses for navigation and the distances that a country’s exploration fleet sailed.  
 
Communications Technology in 1500 A.D. 
 
We measure a country’s adoption of communications technologies by examining the 
technologies used to disseminate written information.  We directly measure these 
technologies by documenting in a country the presence of the following items: paper, books, 
woodblock printing tools, and movable type printing presses.   
 
The technologies we document represent the stages that many countries went through as 
they developed their communications technology.   By 1500 A.D., paper and books had 
diffused throughout most of Asia and Europe.  These technologies were also adopted in 
parts of North Africa.  More advanced technological countries adopted means of more rapid 
reproduction of written communication, such as the moveable type press.   
 
Industrial Technology in 1500 A.D. 
 
Industrial technology measures a country’s adoption of metallurgical technology.   We 
measure a country’s extensive margin of technology adoption by documenting the presence 
of iron and steel production in the country.      
 
By 1500 A.D., iron and steel were being produced in Europe, the Middle East, and East 
Asia.  While iron was being used for tools throughout Africa in 1500 A.D., steel was not 
present in Sub-Saharan Africa before contact with the Europeans.  Also, the technology used 
to produce iron and steel was not present in the New World until after European contact.    
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3. Descriptive statistics  
 
We start the data analysis by presenting in Table 3 some descriptive statistics for the overall 
technology adoption level in 1000BC, 0 A.D. and 1500 A.D. The descriptive statistics for the 
technology adoption measures at the sector level are relegated to Table A2 in the appendix. 
 
__________________INSERT TABLE 3 HERE_____________________________ 
 
The increase in the cross-country average of the overall technology adoption level between 
1000 B.C. and 0 indicates the diffusion of the technologies described in the ACE. Recall that 
the technology adoption data set for 1500 A.D. contains different technologies than the first 
two periods. The decline in the average level of adoption in 1500 A.D. indicates that these 
technologies had diffused less than the technologies from ACE in 0 A.D.  
 
An important question that the descriptive statistics can answer is how large is the cross-
country dispersion in technology adoption. The binary nature of our measures of technology 
adoption for individual technologies provides two benchmarks to interpret the cross-country 
dispersion in technology adoption.
9 First, the maximum range for the average adoption level 
across countries is the interval [0,1]; 0 for a country that has not adopted any of the 
technologies and 1 for a country that has adopted all the technologies. Second, the 
maximum cross-country dispersion in adoption would occur when half of the countries have 
adopted all the technologies and the other half has adopted none. In this case the standard 
deviation of the average adoption level across countries would be 0.5.  
 
In Table 3 we can observe how the range of the average adoption level across countries was 
[0, 1] in all three periods. The fact that these ranges are the maximum possible signals a large 
cross-country dispersion in overall technology adoption.  
 
This conclusion is strengthened by exploring the cross-country standard deviation of the 
aggregate adoption level. In 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. this standard deviation is 0.28 and in 1500 
A.D. it increases to 0.32. These represent 56 and 64 percent, respectively, of the maximum 
feasible dispersion of the aggregate adoption measures. Finally, it is quite remarkable that the 
cross-country dispersion in overall technology adoption has remained roughly constant over 
the three periods despite the 2500 years that separate the first from the third.  
 
 
Figures 1 through 3 and Table 4 explore the cross-country variation in the overall technology 
adoption level. Table 4 explores the variation across continents in overall technology 
adoption. Figures 1 through 3 present a world map with the overall technology adoption 
level in each country and historical period. We use four colors to indicate technology 
adoption levels between 0 and 0.25, between 0.25 and 0.5, between 0.5 and 0.75 and 
between 0.75 and 1. Darker colors represent a higher overall technology adoption level. 
Missing values are represented in white.  
 
 
                                                 
9 The exceptions to this rule are the measures of technology adoption in agriculture.   14




In all three periods, Europe and Asia present the highest average levels of overall technology 
adoption, while America and Oceania present the lowest.  
 
____________ INSERT FIGURES 1-3 HERE ______________________ 
 
A glimpse to the figures suffices to note that there is substantial variance in overall 
technology adoption both across and within continents. To make observation more precise, 
we decompose the cross-country variation in overall technology adoption between the 
variation within continents and the variation across between continents. In 1000BC, about 
65 percent of the variance in overall technology adoption is due to variation within 
continents and 35 percent due to variation between continents. These proportions are 
reversed in 0 A.D. and in 1500 A.D. the share of total variance due to the between continent 
component rises to 78 percent.  
 
Table 5 provides a more detailed comparison of the evolution of overall technology 
adoption in the most advanced countries. These countries correspond to four civilizations: 
Western Europe, China, the Indian civilization and the Arab people. Western Europe 
includes Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and 
Netherlands. The Indian civilization includes India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Finally, the 
Arab civilization includes Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Oman, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.  
 
________________ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE _______________________ 
 
In 1000 B.C. the Arab empire and China have an overall technology adoption level of 0.95 
and 0.9 respectively, while in  India and Western Europe the average adoption level are 0.67 
and 0.65 respectively. In 0 A.D. India and Western Europe catch up with China and the 
Arab empire. In 1500 A.D. Western Europe has completed the transition and is the most 
advanced of the four great empires with an average overall adoption level of 0.94. China 
remains ahead most countries with 0.88. But the Indian and the Arab empires have fallen 
behind. The average overall adoption levels in these empires are 0.7.  
 
 
4. Technology history and current development 
 
Without more delay, we turn next to the question that motivates our exploration. Namely, 
whether centuries-old, pre-colonial technology history determines development today. To 
answer this question, we estimate the following regression  
 
c c c u T y + + = β α                     (1) 
 
where yc is the log of PPP adjusted per capita income in 2002 A.D., Tc is the measure of 
technology adoption and uc is the error term.    15
 
 ___________ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE______________ 
 
The first three columns of Table 6 report the estimates of regression (1) when Tc is measured 
successively by the overall adoption level in 1000 B.C., in 0 and in 1500.A.D. (T-statistics are 
in parentheses.) The technology adoption level in 1000 B.C. is positively associated to the log 
of per capita GDP in 2002, though this association is only significant at the ten percent level. 
Technology adoption in 0 A.D. is not significantly correlated to current development. The 
overall technology adoption level in 1500 A.D. is positively and significantly associated to 
current income per capita. This measure of technology in 1500 A.D. explains 18 percent of 
the variation in log per capita GDP in 2002.  
 
In addition to being statistically significant, the effect of technology on development is 
quantitatively large. Changing from the maximum (i.e. 1) to the minimum (i.e. 0) the overall 
technology adoption level in 1500 A.D. reduces the level of income per capita in 2002 by a 
factor of 5.  
 
Figure 4 presents the scatter plot between overall technology adoption level in 1500 A.D. 
and current development. The positive relationship between these two variables is quite 
transparent. It is clearly not driven by outliers. In the bottom left quadrant of the plot we can 
see many African countries that had adopted very few of the technologies in our 1500 
sample and that are quite poor today. European countries are in the top right corner.  
 
Countries that roughly correspond to ancient empires such as Egypt, Iran, China, India, and 
Pakistan were middle-income countries in 2002 and had adopted between 70 and 90 percent 
of the technologies in our 1500 A.D. sample. These countries are slightly below the 
regression line in the bottom right quadrant of Figure 4.  
 
___________ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE______________ 
 
Latin American countries were behind the median country in the overall technology 
adoption level in 1500 but today they are middle income countries. This very likely has 
something to do with the long period of European settlement in Latin America, even though 
the European settlers were generally a minority of the population.  Finally, in the top left 
corner of Figure 4 we find the Neo-Europes. That is the US, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. These were among the countries with most primitive technology in 1500 A.D. but 
are among the World’s richest countries today. This is very likely due to the large-scale 
replacement of the original inhabitants with European settlers. 
 
We would expect that the European settlers in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies and in 
the Neo-Europes affected quite dramatically the process of technology transfer, human 
capital accumulation and institutional development in these countries during the colonial 
period. Another place where there was large scale (albeit still minority) European settlement 
was southern Africa.  Of course, there could be technology transfer in any colonized nation, 
but the duration and intensity of the influence of the settlement processes in southern 
Africa, Latin America and the Neo-Europes suggest adding special controls. Further, the   16
difference in the degree to which Europeans colonizers substituted for the local population 
justifies the distinction between the Neo-Europes and Latin America/southern Africa.  
 
To formalize this intuition, we use the fraction of European settlers in total population in 
1900 from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
10 This fraction was over 90 percent for 
the Neo-Europes, between 15 percent and 65 percent for South Africa, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, and most countries in Latin America, and below 15 percent for the rest of non-
European countries.  
 
Based on this, we create two dummies. The first captures maximum European influence, and 
takes a value of one for the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia and is zero for the rest 
of the countries. The second dummy reflects lesser European influence than in the neo-
Europes, and takes a value of one for the Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal 
(see the appendix for a complete list), South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland, and is zero 
otherwise. This yields the following regression equation:  
 
c c c c c u Minor Major T y + + + + = β α                 (2) 
 
_______________ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE_________________ 
 
Columns 4 through 6 in Table 6 report the estimates of equation (2) with Tc measured 
successively by the overall technology adoption level in 1000B.C., 0 and 1500 A.D.  
 
_______________INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE_____________________ 
 
We find that the European influence dummies have a significant positive effect on current 
per capita income. Further, when including the European influence dummies, the correlation 
between the overall technology adoption and current development increases. In particular, 
the effects of the technology adoption levels in 1000 B.C. and 0 on current per capita 
income become statistically significant, and the effect of technology in 1500 A.D. almost 
doubles. In other words, once we control for the most obvious historical example of 
replacement of the indigenous technology by technologies brought by new settlers, 
technology in ancient times becomes a significant predictor of per capita income today. 
 
_______________INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE_____________________ 
 
In addition to being significant, the effect of technology history on current development is 
large. An increase in the overall adoption level from 0 to 1 in 1000 B.C. or in 0 A.D. is 
associated with an increase in income per capita in 2002 by a factor of 4. A similar increase 
in the overall adoption level in 1500 A.D. is associated with an increase in per capita income 
in 2002 by a factor of 18. This is half of the current difference in income per capita between 
the top and bottom 5 percent of the countries in the world.  
 
                                                 
10 Similar results are obtained using the share of population from European descent in 1975 from Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001) or the fraction of European settlers 100 years after first settlement from Easterly 
and Levine (2006).   17
Similarly, 20 percent of the income difference between Europe and Africa is explained by 
Africa’s lag in overall technology adoption in 1000 B.C., 7 percent is explained by the 
technology distance in 0 A.D., and 75 percent is explained by Africa’s lag in overall 
technology adoption in 1500 A.D. This gives a very different perspective on Africa’s poverty 
compared to the usual emphasis on modern governments. It also shifts backward in time the 
historical explanations for Africa’s poverty, compared to the usual emphasis of historians on 
the slave trade and colonialism.
11  
 
Figures 5 through 7 display the scatter plots of the current income per capita and overall 
technology adoption after regressing these variables on the European influence dummies. 
These figures confirm the significant association between current development and historical 
technology after conditioning on the European influence dummies. Clearly, the strongest 
relationship holds between overall technology adoption in 1500 A.D. and current 
development.  
 
Finally, we explore which sectors’ technology are driving the observed association between 
overall technology adoption and current development. To investigate this question we 




ic i c u Minor Major T y + + + + = ∑β α                 (3) 
In this specification, i indexes each of the 5 sectors.  
 
_________INSERT TABLE 7 HERE___________________________ 
 
Table 7 reports the estimates of regression (3) for each time period. The main finding is that 
different sectors are driving the positive relationship between overall technology adoption 
and current development for different periods. The sophistication of agricultural technology 
in 1000 B.C. seems important for current development but the importance of agricultural 
technology declines for later periods. Technology adoption history in communications and 
industry in 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. does not have a positive effect on current development 
(communication in 1000 B.C. is negative and significant.) In 1500 A.D., however, the degree 
of technology adoption in communication has a strong positive effect on current 
development. Military technology adoption history in 1000 B.C. and 1500 A.D. have 
important positive effects on current development. Finally, technology adoption history in 
transportation in 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. has a positive effect on current development but the 
transportation technology adoption variable in 1500 A.D. does not affect current 
development. This variation in the conditional correlation of sectoral technology history 
provides some justification for looking at the overall technology adoption measure as the 





                                                 
11 There was some slave trade before 1500 A.D. across the Sahara and along the Indian Ocean. However, most 
accounts of the negative effects of the slave trade stress the Atlantic slave trade, which only became nontrivial 
after 1500 A.D.   18
5. Robustness and Discussion  
 
Next we discuss the robustness and interpretation of the main fact uncovered in the 
previous section, that technology history is positively and strongly associated with current 
development.  
 
A.  Robustness 
 
We start by exploring whether we are identifying the effect of historical technology on 
current development through the cross-continent variation of also through the within 
continent variation. To answer this question, the first three columns of Table 8 report the 
estimates of regression (2) when adding three continent dummies to the control set.  
 
_______________INSERT TABLE 8 HERE______________________ 
 
We extract two main conclusions from columns 1 through 3. First, much of the effect of 
technology history is detected from the cross-continent variation. Adding the continent 
dummies eliminates the effect of overall technology adoption in 1000 B.C. on current 
development (column 1), and by 60 percent the effect of technology adoption in 0 A.D. 
(column 2) and in 1500 A.D. (column 3) on current development. The flip side of this is that 
a significant fraction of the effects of technology adoption history in 0 A.D. and 1500 A.D. 
on current development is driven by the within continent variation. In particular, the within 
continent variation in overall technology adoption in 1500 A.D. can account for cross 
country variation in current income per capita by a factor of 3.25. This effect is statistically 
significant. 
 
Galllup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) have argued that the latitude is an important 
determinant of income per capita, with the tropics at a disadvantage. Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, Easterly and Levine 2003 and Rodrik et al. (2003) 
argue that the effect of tropical location is through institutions. Columns 4 through 9 in 
Table 8 report the estimates of regression (2) after controlling for the distance to the 
Equator (columns 4 through 6) or whether the country is tropical (columns 7 through 9). As 
emphasized by the previous literature,  being far from the Equator tends to be associated 
with higher levels of current income per capita. Controlling for the latitude of countries, 
however, does not eliminate the strong positive effect of overall technology adoption in 
1500 A.D. on current development. This effect remains statistically significant, though the 
effect of technology adoption history on 1000 B.C. and in 0 A.D. on current development 
become insignificant after controlling for the distance to the Equator or after including the 
tropical dummy.  
 
One natural question to study is whether more advanced technology also made higher 
population feasible as well as higher per capita income. To answer this question we estimate 
the effect of primitive technology on the log of real GDP (Yc) and in the log of population 
(Lc), both in 2002, as indicated in regressions (4) and (5). 
 
c c c u T Y + + = β α ) log(                 (4) 
   19
c c c u T L + + = β α ) log(                 (5) 
 
_______________INSERT TABLES 9a-9c HERE______________________ 
 
Table 9a reports the estimates of these specifications for the measures of overall technology 
adoption in each of the three periods. In columns 1 through 3 we observe that the measures 
of primitive technology in 1000 B.C. and in 1500 A.D. have a very significant positive effect 
on current GDP. The effect of technology adoption in 0 A.D. is positive but insignificant. 
Columns 4 through 6 show that countries with higher overall levels of historical technology 
adoption have higher population today. This is the case for each of the three measures of 
primitive technology. Unlike the regressions for per capita income, the coefficient on 
technology in 1000 BC for today’s GDP and population is significant even without including 
the European influence dummies.  
 
In columns 7 through 9 of Table 9a we estimate the effect of technology adoption history on 
land area by estimating the following regression: 
 
c c c u T A + + = β α ) log(                 (6) 
where Ac is the arable land area. Our estimates show that the log of arable land area of 
today’s nation states is also related to historical technology in that area. We interpret this as 
evidence that countries with more advanced technologies could conquer more land and/or 
could control more land more easily.  
 
This could also be another mechanism by which advanced technology led to larger 
populations; conversely countries with larger populations, thanks to more advanced 
technology, could also conquer or settle more territory. Over the very long period that we 
are considering, the size of nations in both area and population is endogenous. Our results 
show that technology is one of the determinants of the size of nations. However, since both 
land area and population are endogenous and we lack good instruments, we cannot separate 
out the relationship between these two different dimensions of size. 
   
Table 9b estimates specifications (4) through (6) adding the two European influence 
dummies. This increases the effects of technology adoption history on current GDP, on 
current population and on current arable land area. Hence, we conclude that historical  
technology adoption facilitated both a larger population and a higher average income.  
 
We next check the robustness of this conclusion to controlling for the distance from the 
Equator which affected the significance of the ancient technology variables in the per capita 
income regressions Columns 1 through 9 in Table 9c show that controlling for distance to 
Equator does not affect the strong positive effect of technology adoption history on current 
GDP, on current population, and on current land area. It is interesting to note that, while 
distance to Equator is positively and significantly associated with current GDP in the 
regressions where technology adoption history is measured at 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D., it is 
insignificantly associated with current GDP when technology adoption is measured in 1500 
A.D. Similarly, while distance to Equator is insignificantly associated with current population 
in the regressions for technology adoption in 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D., it is negatively and 
significantly associated to current population when technology adoption is measured in 1500   20
A.D. We interpret these significant changes in the mechanism by which latitude affects 
current income per capita as a signal that the association of latitude and current development 
is not causal and direct. In contrast, the effect of technology adoption history on current 
GDP and population are robust to measuring technology in any of the three periods. 
 
 
B. Why does old technology matter? 
 
The big question that remains to be addressed is: why does centuries-old, pre-colonial 
technology matter so much for current development? We cannot resolve this here for lack of 
data on other crucial variables for these earlier eras, but we offer some suggestive 
hypotheses. 
 
We think it likely that two related hypotheses will be fruitful for further investigation. First, it 
seems to us the simplest hypothesis with which to begin is that adopting one technology 
today makes it much easier to adopt subsequent technologies in the future.
12 As a result, 
technology adoption is extremely persistent. Countries that adopted new technologies in 
1000 A.C. were more likely to be the technology leaders in 0 A.D.  Technology leaders in 0 
A.D. were more likely to adopt the newest technologies in 1500 A.D. The technological 
leaders in 1500 A.D. in turn were the ones best suited to implement the industrial revolution 
and its many technological sequels. Hence, the leader  countries in 1500 A.D. are still today 
the current technology leaders. Second, we suggest (not so controversially) that technology is  
a principal determinant of a country’s level of development. Hence, countries that currently 
are the technology leaders are the richest countries and countries that fail to use advanced 
technologies are the poorest. In short, as Mokyr (1990) memorably argued, technology is the 
“lever of riches.” 
 
We start our evaluation of this hypothesis by estimating how autocorrelated technology 
adoption is over time. Table 10 presents the cross-country correlation of technology 
adoption across time periods. The cross country correlation of the overall technology 
adoption level between 1000 B.C. and 0 is 0.62, between 0 A.D.  and 1500 A.D. it is 0.71 
and between 1000 B.C. and 1500 A.D. it is 0.68. Table 11 shows that technology adoption is 
also highly persistent after controlling for the distance to the Equator and after adding the 
continent dummies. This remarkably high persistence of technological differences over 2500 
years of human history is another important finding of our paper.
13 (It is also reassuring that 
the error rate on our technological measures is not disastrously high.) 
                                                 
12 We are hypothesizing  this as a direct feature of the innovation technology. An alternative and more complex 
view that is not easy to distinguish with available data is that the dependence of the technology outcome on 
initial conditions is a consequence of increasing returns arising from the positive feedback loop between non-
rival technological ideas and population size (see references mentioned in the introduction – Kremer 1993 and 
Jones 2005; Galor and Weil 2000 and Galor 2005 also add a dynamic interaction with human capital to 
generate the transition from extensive to intensive growth). 
13 An important question is how our findings of technology and income persistence relate to the “reversal of 
fortune”finding of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). Our results are not inconsistent because the 
reversal of fortune is most dramatic in those places occupied by European settlers, where we have introduced 
dummies. Indeed, if we focus on the sub-sample of former colonies we find a negative association between 
technology history in 1500 A.D. and current development. However, this association disappears when we 
introduce the major European influence dummy. We interpret the dummies as representing technology transfer 
in light of our other evidence in this paper, but we cannot necessarily contradict AJR’s interpretation of   21
 
_________INSERT TABLES 10 AND 11 HERE_____________________  
 
We also observe this very high persistence of technology adoption for the sector-level 
measures.  The average correlation coefficient between the technology adoption in a sector 
in one period and in the subsequent period is around 0.5. Technology adoption is most 
persistent in military, industry and transportation. In these sectors, the cross-country 
correlation between technology adoption in 1000 B.C. and in 1500 A.D. it is between 0.6 
and 0.69. In Agriculture the correlation is 0.42, while in communications it is only 0.22. This 
latter correlation is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. All the other correlations 
reported in Table 10 are significant at the 1/10000 level.
14  As shown in Table 11, the high 
autocorrelation of overall technology adoption is robust to controlling for the distance to the 
Equator and for the continent dummies. 
 
In the light of these estimates, technology adoption history seems more persistent than any 
other determinant of development. Institutions, for example, which have been regarded as 
highly persistent, have been more volatile than technology over the past two centuries. 
 
To obtain an estimate of the persistence of modern institutions we use the Polity IV measure 
of democracy. This variable takes values from -10 to 10, 10 being most democratic, and it is 
available from 1800 until the present. We estimate the coefficient of democracy on 
democracy 50 years ago using non-overlapping observations to be 0.59. It seems remarkable 
that this widely used measure of institutions is less persistent over a 50 year period than 
overall technology adoption over a 2500 year period. Of course, this could be a flawed 
measure of institutions, and other deeper definitions of institutions could show stronger 
persistence. For example, there is an influential intellectual tradition that locates the origins 
of Western democracy and freedom in ancient Greece and Rome. However, this is 
speculative in the absence of more rigorous measures and tests.  
 
The second premise in our hypothesis is that technology has a strong, positive and 
contemporaneous effect on development. Few would dispute that technology has a large 
effect on development, but there is some debate about its importance relative to factor 
accumulation. A very important role for technology has been shown indirectly for the post-
war period by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999). In particular 
they show the importance of TFP to explain the cross-country variation in income per capita 
nowadays. More recently, Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2006) have compiled 100 direct 
measures of technology covering most sectors of economic activity in 150 countries over the 
last two centuries. They have shown that there is a strong cross-country association between 
technology and income per capita and that cross-country variation in physical technology 
may explain up to 50 percent of the observed cross-country differences in income per capita.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
institutional differences being the explanation for this shift. We plan to investigate this further in future work. 
In a broader sense, there is no reason to restrict the sample to the group of former colonies. As shown in Table 
6, we find that in the whole sample there is a strong positive association between overall technology adoption 
in 1500 A.D. and current development. In this sense, there is a “persistence of fortune”. 
14 An alternative way to convey the same message is to estimate convergence regressions for the  technology 
adoption measures both for each sector and for the aggregate. The conclusion from this exercise is that there is 
convergence but at an extremely slow pace.    22
__________________INSERT TABLE 12 HERE______________________ 
 
One difficulty in demonstrating the contemporaneous connection between technology and 
development is that we do not have historical series for income per capita that go back very 
far. An alternative route suggested by several authors
15 consists in using the urbanization rate 
as proxies for development level (they are strongly correlated in the modern data across 
countries.) This is a particularly good proxy for pre-modern periods such as the ones 
covered by our technology adoption data set.  
 
The urbanization rate for 1000 B.C. and 0 A.D. come from Peregrine’s “ACE”,
16 while the 
urbanization rate for 1500 A.D. come from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002). Table 
12 reports the estimated contemporaneous effects of overall technology adoption on the 
urbanization rate. We find that there is a strong and positive contemporaneous association 
between technology adoption history and the contemporaneous urbanization rates. We 
extract two conclusions from this finding. First, it provides further support for the quality of 
our measures of technology adoption in pre-colonial times. Second, if we grant that 
urbanization is a good proxy for development, it shows that the contemporaneous 
relationship between technology adoption and development also holds in earlier periods.  
 
In columns 4 through 6 of Table 12 we show that the positive contemporaneous association 
between overall technology adoption and the urbanization rate is robust to controlling for 
distance to the Equator. Indeed, distance from the Equator typically does not have a 
significant effect on urbanization. Since the mechanisms used to justify the effect of latitude 
on development are atemporal, this finding also weakens the case for a causal role of latitude 
on development.  
 
This evidence is suggestive that ancient technological prowess facilitated modern 
technological prowess, which in turn determines modern development. However, there are 
loopholes due to lack of data that leaves this only suggestive. We do not have data on 
ancient institutions, so we cannot assess whether technology is proxying for quality of 
ancient institutions. We obviously don’t have data on ancient factor accumulation, so we 
cannot assess the relative role of factor accumulation and technology in ancient development 
outcomes.  
 
One thing that we can say more confidently based on our findings is that development is a 
very long run process. However much institutions, factor accumulation, and technology may 
have been bound up together in the past, our findings still show that the ancient past – as 





                                                 
15 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002), for example. 
16 Peregrine (2003) constructs a measure of the urbanization rate that can take three values. 1 if the largest 
settlement is smaller than 100 persons. 2 if it is between 100 and 399 persons. 3 if it is larger than 400 
persons.     23
6. Conclusions 
 
The finding of this paper is a simple one: centuries-old technological history still matters 
today. The most surprising part of the finding is just how old the history can be and still 
matter. Our most robust finding is that technology in 1500 AD matters for development 
outcomes today, itself remarkably old when we consider that most history discussions of 
developing countries start with European contact and colonization. Even more surprising is 
that technology in 1000 BC and 0 AD has a significant effect in many specifications.  While 
of course this finding is subject to standard caveats about the quality of data from ancient 
periods, the finding has important implications to the extent that it survives those caveats. 
 
This finding is at least suggestive that technology is a strong candidate for being a principal 
determinant of development; this paper increased our prior weights on technology vis-à-vis 
competing explanations such as institutions and factor accumulation (not to go to the 
extreme that those latter things don’t matter). We consider our findings suggestive of the 
important role of technology even though missing data on ancient institutions and factor 
accumulation make this suggestion less than air-tight. 
 
What does seem inescapable from this finding (if it is taken at face value despite the caveats) 
is that development is a very long run process. The tendency of policymakers and 
international institutions to overemphasize the instruments under their control may have 
contributed to an excessive weight being placed on the behavior of modern-day 
governments and development strategies as a determinant of development outcomes.  
 
This is not to say that history is destiny. Our technology history only explained a partial 
share of the modern day variance of development outcomes, and so history is obviously not 
all that matters. 
 
Even giving any substantial weight to centuries-old history may not be so appealing from a 
policy-making point of view, but the world is as it is. The world seems to be a place where 
the long eons of history still matter very much today.    
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Figure 3: Overall technology adoption in 1500 A.D. 
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Figure 5: (Conditional) overall technology adoption in 1000 B.C. and 
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Figure 6: (Conditional) overall technology adoption in 0 A.D. and (conditional) 
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Figure 7: (Conditional) overall technology adoption in 1500 A.D. and 



















































































































































Residual overall technology adoption level in 1500AD
 
 Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Overall Technology Adoption
Period Number Obs. Average Std. Dev. Min Max
1000BC 113 0.45 0.28 0 1
0 135 0.73 0.28 0 1
1500AD 123 0.46 0.32 0 1
 Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Overall Technology Adoption by Continent
Period Continent Number Obs. Average Std. Dev. Min Max
1000BC  
Europe 30 0.66 0.16 0.5 1
  
Africa 34 0.36 0.31 0 1
  
Asia 23 0.58 0.25 0.1 1
 
America 24 0.24 0.12 0 0.4
 
Oceania 2 0.2 0.14 0.1 0.3
0AD       
Europe 33 0.88 0.15 0.7 1
Africa 40 0.77 0.2 0.6 1
Asia 34 0.88 0.15 0.6 1
 
America 25 0.33 0.17 0 0.6
Oceania 3 0.17 0.11 0.1 0.3
1500AD     
Europe 26 0.87 0.074  0.69 1
 
Africa 39 0.32 0.2 0.1 0.78
 
Asia 25 0.66 0.19 0.07 0.88
America 24 0.14 0.07 0 0.13
Oceania 9 0.12 0.04 0 0.13Table 5: Average Overall Technology Adoption in Advanced Civilizations
Civilization 1000BC 0 AD 1500 AD
W. Europe 0.65 0.96 0.94
  
China 0.9 1 0.88
  
Indian 0.67 0.9 0.7
 
Arab 0.95 1 0.7
Note: W. Europe includes Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Germany, 
Belgium and Netherlands. Indian Empire includes India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Arab Empire includes Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Oman, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco Table 6: Technology History and Current Development
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V VI VII
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 0.67 1.38
(1.75) (2.89)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 0.04 1.43
(0.11) (2.74)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD 1.6 2.92
(4.98) (8.17)
Major European Involvement 1.9 2.46 2.82 3.21
(11.71) (10.69) (8.1) (12.86)
Minor European Involvement 0.24 0.61 0.85 1.42
(1.37) (2.67) (3.22) (5.89)
Constant 8.21 8.47 7.76 8.02 7.7 7.21 6.75
(39.37) (30.35) (37.49) (65.07) (27.13) (17.27) (27.06)
N 103 122 106 124 103 122 106
R2 0.03 0 0.18 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.5
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
Major European Involvement is a dummy that is 1 for US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
Minor European Involvement is a dummy that is 1 mostly for Latin American, Caribean Countries and southern Africa. 
Log Income per capita in 2002Table 7: Sectoral Primitive Technology and Current Development
Dependent variable
Technology adoption in  1000BC 0 1500AD
Agriculture 0.82 0.47 -0.69
(2.06) (1.29) (1.79)
Communications -2.48 -0.21 1.31
(3.59) (0.68) (3.53)
Industry -1.38 -0.83 0.08
(1.52) (1.38) (0.15)
Military 2.54 -0.15 1.2
(2.4) (0.34) (2.71)
Transportation 1.69 1.28 0.54
(3.51) (3.36) (0.94)
N 103 122 106
R2 0.4 0.2 0.56
Note: All regressions include major European and minor European dummies and a constant
t-statistics in parenthesis
log GDP/capita 2002Table 8: Primitive Technology and Current Development, Robustness
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 0.09 0.2   0.52
(0.22) (0.24)  (1.17)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 0.58 0.04   0.45
(1.38) (0.09)  (0.96)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD 1.18 1.46   2.3
(1.94) (2.8)  (4.99)
Europe dummy 1.74 1.58 0.68
(7.67) (5.17) (1.27)
Africa dummy -0.34 -0.66 -1.09
(2.03) (2.39) (3.44)
Asia dummy 0.36 0.34 -0.55
(1.31) (1.03) (1.23)
America dummy 0.19 0.15 -0.22
(1.04) (0.84) (0.69)
Distance to equator 3.9 4.14 2.91
(8.48) (9.02) (4.1)
Tropical dummy -1.13 -1.21 -0.52
(5.49) (6.42) (2.3)
N 103 122 106 97 114 103 103 122 106
R2 0.6 0.62 0.67 0.54 0.45 0.6 0.37 0.36 0.52
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
All regressions include major and minor European involvement dummies and a constant.
Log Income per capita in 2002Table 9a: Technology History, Current GDP, Population and Arable Land
 
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 1.75 1.23 1.48
(2.43) (2.28) (2.66)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 0.87 0.97 0.43
(1.36) (2.1) (0.68)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD 3.77 2.42 1.45
(6.14) (4.13) (2.54)
Major and Minor european involvement dummies
N 103 122 105 112 134 117 109 131 114
R2 0.06 0.02 0.27 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.06 0 0.06
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
All regressions include a constant.
Log GDP 2002 Log Arable Land
NO NO
Log Population 2002
NOTable 9b: Technology History, Current GDP, Population and Arable Land, European Influence Dummies
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 2.86 1.85 2.18
(3.76) (2.99) (3.67)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 3.63 2.39 2.03
(4.78) (3.6) (2.31)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD 5.91 3.51 2.66
(11.23) (5.09) (4.14)
Major and Minor european involvement dummies
N 103 122 105 112 134 117 109 131 114
R2 0.22 0.21 0.54 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.2 0.11 0.2
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
All regressions include a constant.
Log Arable Land
YES YES
Log GDP 2002 Log Population 2002
YESTable 9c: Technology History, Current GDP, Population and Arable Land, Distance from Equator
 
Dependent Variable
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX  
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 2.31 2.47 1.98
(2.56) (3.18) (3.07)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 2.33 2.57 1.55
(2.78) (3.49) (1.77)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD 5.43 4.66 2.53
(7.23) (5.68) (2.18)
Distance from Equator 2.96 3.5 -0.073 -0.52 -0.46 -3.2 1.38 2.1 0.44
(2.56) (4.33) (0.08) (0.6) (0.71) (3.06) (1.56) (2.46) (0.27)
N 97 114 103 105 125 113 104 124 111
R2 0.3 0.28 0.54 0.13 0.11 0.3 0.23 0.15 0.2
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
All regressions include major and minor European Influence dummies and a constant.
Log Arable land Log GDP 2002 Log Population 2002Table 10: Correlation of technology adoption measures over time
 
 Overall Agri. Military Industry Comm. Transport.
Correlation (1000BC, 0AD) 0.62 0.39 0.51 0.39 0.32 0.64
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation (0AD, 1500 AD) 0.71 0.41 0.51 0.64 0.51 0.71
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation (1000BC, 1500AD) 0.68 0.42 0.69 0.6 0.22 0.6
p-value 0 0 0 0 0.03 0Table 11: Correlation of technology adoption measures over time
 
Dependent Variable Overal technology adoption in: 0 A.D. 1500 A.D. 1500 A.D. 0 A.D. 1500 A.D. 1500 A.D.
Overall Technology Adoption in 1000 B.C. 0.63 0.58 0.39 0.33
 (8.03) (5.44) (6.01) (3.1)
Overall Technology Adoption in 0 A.D.   0.63   0.39
   (12.22)   (4.46)
Distance from Equator 0.17 0.7 0.72
 (1.45) (7.03) (5.77)
Continent dummies
N 103 106 94 110 106 94
R2 0.44 0.67 0.6 0.64 0.7 0.71
NO YESTable 12: Urbanization rate and technology adoption history
Dependent Variable: Urbanization rate in  1000 B.C. 0 A.D.  1500 A.D. 1000 B.C.  0 A.D.  1500 A.D.
Overall Technology adoption level in 1000BC 2.08   1.96
(19.38)  (22.57)
Overall Technology adoption level in 0 1.69 1.68
(13.59) (12.77)
Overall Technology adoption level in 1500AD   8.4 9.5
 (3.46) (4.24)
Distance from Equator       0.39 0.16 -2.83
     (1.25) (0.84) (0.57)
N 113 135 52 106 126 50
R2 0.5 0.58 0.2 0.48 0.59 0.21
Note: t-statistics in parenthesis computed using robust standard errors.
All regressions include a constant